

deutsches forschungsnetz

## **Certification Policy of the**

### **DFN-PKI**

– Security Level “Global” –

**DFN-Verein**  
**CP of DFN-PKI**  
**V12 01 September 2023**  
**non-authoritative English translation**

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Contact: [pki@dfn.de](mailto:pki@dfn.de)

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## 1 Introduction

The *Verein zur Förderung eines Deutschen Forschungsnetzes e. V.* (DFN-Verein) operates the German Research and Education Network, *Deutsches Forschungsnetz* (DFN) and ensures its further development and utilisation. This high-performance network for science and research links institutions of higher education and research institutions with one another and supports the development and testing of new applications in Germany. This is the basis on which the DFN-Verein makes services available to its users. One such service is the provision of a Public Key Infrastructure (DFN-PKI). Further information (in German) about DFN-PKI is available under <http://www.pki.dfn.de>.

### 1.1 Overview

This document contains the Certification Policy (CP) of the DFN-PKI for the Security Level "Global". It regulates procedures and in particular specifies the conditions for the issuance of certificates in accordance with the international standard X.509 [X.509]. The regulations in this document relate exclusively to the Security Level "Global" of DFN-PKI.

The regulations in this CP and in the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of the DFN-PCA are binding in full for all participants in the DFN-PKI. The CPS provides details of the implementation of the requirements of the CP of the DFN-PKI.

Within the framework of the DFN-PKI, the DFN-Verein organises the Policy Certification Authority (DFN-PCA) and all subordinate certification authorities (Sub-CAs) for the Security Level "Global".

CP and CPS in the DFN-PKI are structures in accordance with RFC 3647 [RFC3647].

The DFN-PCA and all its subordinate CAs (Sub-CAs) fulfil the requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [ETSI319411] in accordance with the OVCP Policy for certificates for data processing systems and the NCP policy for certificates for natural persons.

The DFN-PCA and all its subordinate CAs (Sub-CAs) comply with the requirements of the current version of the *Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates* [CAB-BR] and the *Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates* [CAB-SMIMEBR] published under <http://www.cabforum.org>. In the case of any inconsistency between this document and [CAB-BR] or [CAB-SMIMEBR], then the provisions of [CAB-BR] or [CAB-SMIMEBR] shall apply.

From 01.09.2023 on, new certificates are only issued in security level "Global" of the DFN-PKI for the operation of revocation services. End-entity certificates (certificates for data processing systems, persons, groups or pseudonyms) or certificates for subordinate CAs are not issued any more.

### 1.2 Document Name and Identification

This Certificate Policy document is identified as follows:

Title: Certification Policy of the DFN-PKI - Security Level "Global" -

Version: 12 (non-authoritative English translation)

Object Identifier (OID): 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4.12

The OID [OID] is constituted as follows:

```
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) dfn-verein(22177) pki(300) cp(1) x.509(1) global(4) major-version(12)}
```

In the certificates issued, this Object Identifier documents conformity with [ETSI319411].

### 1.3 PKI Participants

#### 1.3.1 Certification Authorities

The Certification Authorities (CAs) are responsible for the issuance of certificates within the DFN-PKI.

The Policy Certification Authority of the DFN-PKI (DFN-PCA) is solely responsible for certifying certificates of directly subordinate CAs in accordance with this CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI. The DFN-PCA and all subordinate CAs in the DFN-PKI are operated by the DFN-Verein. The public key of DFN-PCA is contained in the certificate "DFN-Verein Certification Authority 2" presented by "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2".

Certificates for subordinate CAs can be issued in the DFN-PKI solely through the DFN-PCA. There is a subordinate CA for issuing end-entity certificates for the participants in the DFN-PKI called "DFN-Verein Global Issuing CA". In addition, DFN-Verein reserves the right to issue further subordinate issuing CAs under the DFN-PCA for participants with special requirements.

### **1.3.2 Registration Authorities**

A Registration Authority (RA) is responsible for the scrutiny of the identity and authenticity of subscribers and subjects. These responsibilities are assumed by DFN-PCA.

In order to identify natural persons, the DFN-PCA may make use of an "Applicant Representative". The DFN-PCA has a list of all applicant representatives.

### **1.3.3 Subscribers**

Subscribers are organisations that subscribe to the DFN-PKI and have signed an appropriate subscriber agreement with the DFN-Verein. These organisations apply for certificates for individuals and data processing systems within their organisational realm. These persons and data processing systems are the Subjects.

The range of possible subscribers is given in the Articles of the DFN-Verein [DFN2000], in particular Article 2:

"The Association promotes the creation of the scientific and technical conditions required for establishing, operating, and using a computer-based information and communications system for publicly-supported and non-profit research in the Federal Republic of Germany [...]."

### **1.3.4 Relying Parties**

Relying Parties are natural persons and organisations that rely on a Valid Certificate.

### **1.3.5 Other Participants**

If a service provider is active on behalf of a Subscriber, then the commissioning subscriber is responsible for the service provider's compliance with the CP and CPS.

## **1.4 Certificate Usage**

### **1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses**

Certificates issued under the DFN-PKI may be used for all purposes that are enabled for the key use purposes contained in the certificate.

Depending on the profile of the certificate, these include:

- Authentication of servers with TLS
- Authentication of users (TLS-Client-Authentication)
- Digital signature and encryption of e-mails (S/Mime)
- Code signing

Subscribers or Subjects are responsible for the use in the application programs, as well as for checking whether the possible applications satisfy their security requirements.

### **1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses**

Uses of the certificate that contravene the Articles of the DFN-Verein (see Section 1.3.3), are prohibited.

The use of the certificate shall not be in contravention of key use purposes contained in the certificate, in particular the issuance of certificates and certificate revocation lists are exclusively reserved for CAs.

## **1.5 Policy Administration**

### **1.5.1 Organisation Administering the document**

This document is administered by the DFN-Verein.

### **1.5.2 Contact person**

The contact person for this document is:

DFN-Verein

Tel: +49 30 884299 955

Dr Ralf Gröper  
Alexanderplatz 1  
10178 Berlin, Germany

Fax: +49 30 884299 70  
E-mail: [pki@dfn.de](mailto:pki@dfn.de) (no 24x7 monitoring)  
[www.pki.dfn.de](http://www.pki.dfn.de)

Contact for emergencies in which certificates from the DFN-PKI are misused or demonstrably compromised (see also Section 4.9):

- E-mail: [cert-problems@dfn.de](mailto:cert-problems@dfn.de)

### 1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The person named in Section 1.5.2 is responsible for the annual check of the CPS in the DFN-PKI.

### 1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

The CPS is approved by the management board of the DFN-Verein

## 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

See Section 11.

## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

### 2.1 Repositories

For each CA of DFN-PKI, the information listed in Section 2.2 shall be made public in accordance with Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.

### 2.2 Publication of Certification Information

The following information shall be disclosed:

- CP of DFN-PKI
- CPS of DFN-PKI
- Certificate of “T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2” and its fingerprint
- Reference to the revocation information of “T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2”
- Certificates of the DFN-PCA and its Sub-CAs, with their fingerprints
- Contact information, under which revocation can be applied for
- Revocation information of DFN-PCA and its Sub-CAs
- Reference to the repository service of DFN-PKI
- Duties of the Subscribers
- Information for Subjects

This information is published online under <https://www.pki.dfn.de/policies/informationen> and is accessible at all times (24 hours a day, 7 days a week). It will be ensured that outages and maintenance stoppages are minimised and that operations are resumed as quickly as possible.

### 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

For the up-dating of the information specified in Section 2.2 the following deadlines apply:

- Certificates: At least three working days after issuance
- CP and CPS: After a new version comes into force (after being announced, see Section 9.10.1)

Revocation information:

- CRLs: See Section 4.9.7
- OCSP: By analogy to CRLs (see Section 4.9.7)

CP and CPS shall be reviewed annually, in particular for compatibility with the [CAB-BR] and [CAB-SMIMEBR]. An update will be carried out at least every year, during which at least the version number will be increased and an entry will be made in the change history.

## 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

All the information listed in Section 2.2 may be read without access control. Writing access to the information is only available to entitled individuals.

## 3 Identification and Authentication

### 3.1 Naming

#### 3.1.1 Type of Names

In the DFN-PKI, a uniform name hierarchy is used. All Certificates issued in the DFN-PKI include a distinguished name (DN) in accordance with the X.500 standard series. A DN contains a sequence of characteristic attributes which reference each subject uniquely.

A DN has the following composition: optional attributes are set in square brackets, attribute values in angle brackets shall be replaced by the relevant value. The sequence of the attributes shall be maintained. The significance of the attributes is described in Section 3.1.2.

C=<Country>  
ST=<Federal state or province>  
L=<Location>  
O=<Organisation>  
[orgIdentifier=<OrganizationID>]  
[ pseudonym = <pseudonym>]  
[ SN = <surname>]  
[ GN = <givenname>]  
CN=<Common name>  
[ emailAddress=<E-mail address> ]

The attributes "C" and "O" shall be stated once only.

The attribute „orgIdentifier“ will be stated in S/MIME certificates for natural persons or in pseudonym certificates

The "pseudonym" attribute may be specified exactly once in pseudonym certificates.

The SN attribute may be specified exactly once in certificates for natural persons, GN once or not at all.

The attribute "emailAddress" may have multiple entries.

Although it is possible to enter e-mail addresses in the DN, they should in preference be included in the certificate extension "subjectAlternativeName".

Certificates for data processing systems do not contain e-mail addresses, neither in the DN nor in the subjectAlternativeName.

CA certificates contain at least the attributes „C“, „O“ and „CN“.

#### 3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The DN must uniquely identify the subject and it must be meaningful.

The following rules apply for the naming:

The mandatory attribute "C" shall be the 2-character code (in accordance with ISO Standard 3166-1 [ISO-3166-1]) of the country in which the Organisation named under the attribute "O" is located.

The attribute "ST" shall contain the official name of the federal state or province in which the Organisation named under the attribute "O" is located.

The attribute "L" shall contain the official name of the location of the Organisation named under the attribute "O".

The mandatory attribute "O" shall contain the name of the Subscriber. The authenticity of the name is to be checked in accordance with Section 3.2.2.



In S/MIME certificates, the attribute "orgIdentifier" contains an identifier that identifies the organisation from a naming scheme and registers that are permitted according to [CAB-SMIMEBR].

The DN contains exactly one attribute "CN". It must contain an appropriate presentation of the name of the Subject. The following shall apply:

- a) An attribute "CN" in a certificate for a data processing system shall contain alternatively:
  - A fully-qualified Domain Name, with a Domain registered by a Domain Name Registrar certified by ICANN. The right to use the name in a certificate is checked in accordance with Section 3.2.2.
  - An IP address registered with an Internet Registrar authorised by IANA. The right to use the IP address in a certificate is checked in accordance with Section 3.2.2.
- b) An attribute "CN" in a certificate for a natural person shall contain alternatively:
  - The name of the person, consisting at least at least a first name written in full and the surname of the Subject; other first names and name suffixes of the Subject may be included in full or in an abbreviated form, or omitted entirely. All names and any supplements (e.g. "Dr") may only be included if these are contained in the identification document used for the authentication of the individual (see Section 3.2.3). The surname can be additionally included in an attribute "SN" without any supplements, the first name in the attribute "GN".
  - A pseudonym. When assigning pseudonyms, any possibility of mistaken identity must be avoided, e.g. confusion with natural persons or organisations. Nor shall a pseudonym include Domain Names or IP-addresses. A pseudonym shall not have offensive or lewd contents. The pseudonym must be uniquely assigned to the subject (authenticated in accordance with Section 3.2.3). The pseudonym must begin with the attribute "PN:" or "PN - ", e.g. "PN:Cover name". The pseudonym can be additionally included in an attribute "pseudonym" without the marking "PN:" or "PN - ".
- c) An attribute "CN" in a certificate for a Certification Authority contains an identifier for the certificate that is unique for all certificates issued by the issuing certificate..

If the optional attribute "emailAddress" is included once or more often, then in each case it must contain an e-mail address formatted in accordance with RFC 822 [RFC822]. The right to use the e-mail address in a certificate is checked in accordance with Section 3.2.3. In the event that a number of "emailAddress" attributes are given, then these shall be included in the DN directly one after the other.

Certificates for data processing systems do not contain e-mail addresses, neither in the DN nor in the subjectAlternativeName.

The above-mentioned rules apply by analogy for e-mail addresses, IP addresses and Domain names included in the Certificate extension for alternative certificate names ("subjectAlternativeName") under the Types "rfc822Name", "iPAddress" or "dNSName".

If an attribute value is longer than allowed by the relevant standard, then in its place a suitable (and where possible familiar) abbreviation shall be used.

### 3.1.3 Anonymity and Pseudonymity of Subscribers

For natural persons, a pseudonym may be used in the Certificate. This must be clearly shown as such in the attribute "CN" and may be additionally specified in the attribute "pseudonym" (see Section 3.1.2). The pseudonym is uniquely assigned to the subject (authenticated in accordance with Section 3.2.3). This is documented in the paperwork generated with the application for the Certificate. The Pseudonym can thus be traced back to the real identity of the Subject.

Anonymous certificates may not be issued.

### 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

In the DN-attributes "ST", "L", "O" and "CN", only the following characters shall be used:

a-z A-Z 0-9 ' ( ) , - . / : space

In the CN, an "\*" may be used additionally for specific types of certificates.

The following substitutions rules exist for replacing special German characters:

Ä -> Ae, Ö ->Oe, Ü -> Ue, ä -> ae, ö -> oe, ü -> ue, ß -> ss

Special symbols with accents lose the accent. Otherwise, common transliterations of relevant signs are used, generated with the characters a-z and A-Z to form the appropriate sound.

Subject attributes MUST NOT contain only metadata such as '.', '-', and ' ' (i.e. space) characters, and/or any other indication that the value is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

Before certification, the correctness and uniqueness of the names is checked by the DFN-PCA. The DN of a Subject must be unique and may not be given to different subjects.

In the event of a clash of names, then the principle of "First come, first served" applies. In cases of dispute, the DFN-PCA decides. The unambiguity of the DN can be achieved by the use of pseudonyms, e.g. "PN: John Smith 2".

### 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks

If the CN of a certificate refers to a natural person, then a recognition of trade marks or similar is not relevant. In all other cases, it is the sole responsibility of the participant to ensure that the choice of name does not infringe on trademarks or similar. The DFN-PCA is not obliged to check for such infringements. On being informed of such an infringement of rights it must revoke the certificate.

## 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

In the DFN-PKI "Global", S/MIME certificates for natural persons or pseudonym certificates of the type "Sponsor-validated" are issued according to the [CAB-SMIMEBR].

### 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

On application it must be proved that the future subject is in possession of the private key. This is done by signing the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) contained in the certificate application using the private key and submitting this to the CA. The CA must examine the validity of the signature.

### 3.2.2 Authentication of Organisation and Domain Identity

The name of an organisation and its registered office (country, state, city) is authenticated by official registers, state or federal laws. A registration number identifying the organisation is obtained from an official register. Only naming schemes and registers permitted by [CAB-SMIMEBR] are used.

If a domain name (FQDN) or an IP address is used in a certificate, then the right of the organisation to use this domain name or this IP address will be checked by the DFN-Verein as operator of the DFN-PCA.

For verification of domain names, one of the following methods is used:

1. The organisation's right to use the FQDN by is confirmed by sending a Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value is sent to an email address, fax/SMS number, or postal mail address identified as a Domain Contact. (Method according to chapter 3.2.2.4.2 of [CAB-BR]). It is ensured that:
  - Each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail may confirm control of multiple Authorization Domain Names.
  - DFN-PCA may send the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail identified under this section to more than one recipient provided that every recipient is identified by the Domain Name Registrar as representing the Domain Name Registrant for every FQDN being verified using the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.
  - The Random Value is unique in each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.
  - DFN-PCA may resend the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail in its entirety, including re-use of the Random Value, provided that the communication's entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged.
  - The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS may specify a shorter validity period for Random Values, in which case the CA MUST follow its CPS.
  - Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, also Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN may be issued.
  - This method is also used for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

2. The organisation's right to use the FQDN by is confirmed by sending an email to one or more addresses created by using 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' as the local part, followed by the at- sign ("@"), followed by an Authorization Domain Name, including a Random Value in the email, and receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. (Method according to chapter 3.2.2.4.4 of [CAB-BR]). It is ensured that:
  - Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the Authorization Domain Name used in the email is an Authorization Domain Name for each FQDN being confirmed
  - The Random Value is unique in each email.
  - The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient remain unchanged.
  - The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.
  - Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, also Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN may be issued.
  - This method is also used for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

For verification of IP-addresses, one of the following methods is used:

1. The Applicant's control over the IP Address is confirmed by sending a Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value is sent to an email address, fax/SMS number, or postal mail address identified as an IP Address Contact. (Method according to chapter 3.2.2.5.2 of [CAB-BR]). It is ensured that:
  - Each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail may confirm control of multiple IP Addresses.
  - DFN-PCA may send the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail identified under this section to more than one recipient provided that every recipient is identified by the IP Address Registration Authority as representing the IP Address Contact for every IP Address being verified using the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.
  - The Random Value is unique in each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.
  - DFN-PCA may resend the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail in its entirety, including re-use of the Random Value, provided that the communication's entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged.
  - The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.
2. Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by obtaining a Domain Name associated with the IP Address through a reverse-IP lookup on the IP Address and then verifying control over the FQDN using a method permitted under the paragraphs above. (Method according to chapter 3.2.2.5.3 of [CAB-BR]).
3. Confirming the Applicant's control over the IP Address by calling the IP Address Contact's phone number and obtaining a response confirming the Applicant's request for validation of the IP Address. (Method according to chapter 3.2.2.5.5 of [CAB-BR]). It is ensured that:
  - DFN-PCA places the call to a phone number identified by the IP Address Registration Authority as the IP Address Contact.
  - Each phone call is made to a single number.
  - In the event that someone other than an IP Address Contact is reached, DFN-PCA may request to be transferred to the IP Address Contact.
  - In the event of reaching voicemail, DFN-PCA may leave the Random Value and the IP Address(es) being validated.
  - The Random Value must be returned to the CA to approve the request.
  - The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

No certificates are issued for data processing systems containing internal IP addresses or internal names.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Internal IP addresses are listed in the IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry [IANA\_IP4] and in the IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry [IANA\_IP6].*

*The definition of internal names is given in [CAB-BR]*

### **3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity**

The authentication of the identity of a natural person is carried out by the DFN-PCA or the participating organisation as an Enterprise RA.

If the DFN-PCA performs the identification of a natural person, the following applies:

The authentication requires confirmation of personal identity on the basis of a valid official identity document with a photograph (ID document or passport) and shall be appropriately documented. The security features of identity documents are checked to detect forgeries or falsifications. The DFN-PCA publishes a list of security features that must be checked.

In the case of a change of name that has not yet been entered in the valid identification document as presented, e.g. after marriage, then in addition to the valid identification document the authentication may draw on a civil status certificate that is not more than 6 months old.

The following information shall be presented and checked:

- Name, First name(s) and supplements to the name where these are included in the identification document
- E-mail address
- Type of the identification document and the last five digits of its number, or, if this data is not available due to the chosen of identification method, other attributes which can be used to, as far as possible, distinguish the person from others with the same name.
- Name and address of the given organisation
- Proof of association with the given organisation
- This information is necessary for the issue of the certificate and will be recorded. On the basis of this data, the identification of the natural person is possible.
- E-mail addresses to be included in certificates for natural persons or groups are verified by one of the following methods:
  1. Challenge-response method where an e-mail is sent to the e-mail address to be verified. The e-mail contains a link with an individual 128-bit long random number. The link must be called by the applicant before the request can be processed. The link is valid for max. 24 hours.
  2. Or matching against Subscriber-managed address lists if the Subscriber itself assigns the e-mail-addresses to be included in the certificate. In this procedure, the domain of the e-mail address is checked according to the rules in Chapter 3.2.2.

### **3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber information**

Apart from the details in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3, no further information will be checked.

### **3.2.5 Validation of Authority**

Each Subscriber shall nominate at least one person who is empowered to apply for Certificates on their behalf.

Empowered persons give evidence of the authenticity of certificate applications to the DFN-PCA either by their manual signature (empowered person), or by a signature with a personal certificate (applicant representative). The DFN-PCA holds a complete list of the sample signatures of the empowered persons and a list of these certificates. This list is supplied to the Subscriber on request.

Every empowered person shall be authenticated in accordance with Section 3.2.3.

### **3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation**

The DFN-PCA publishes all cross certificates for CA certificates in the security level "Global" that have been commissioned or accepted by it.

## **3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests**

### **3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key**

For routine Certificate renewal, then in addition to the method in accordance with Section 3.2.3, the identity of a natural person may be authenticated by a valid personal certificate

from the DFN-PKI if the underlying identification was performed within the time limit defined in Section 4.2.1.

### **3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key After Revocation**

After the revocation of a certificate, an authentication can no longer be carried out with the revoked certificate.

### **3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests**

The authentication of a revocation (see Section 4.9) can be carried out as follows:

- Transmission of previously agreed authentication information (in writing, by telephone, or electronically)
- Transfer of a revocation application with a suitable electronic signature which authenticates the Subscriber or the Subject
- Presenting a revocation application with a manual signature

## **4 Certificate Live-Cycle Operational Requirements**

### **4.1 Certificate application**

#### **4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application**

In the DFN-PKI, Subscribers can apply for certificates in accordance with Section 1.3.3. If the certificate is for a natural person, the Subscriber must have an authorisation for them.

#### **4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities**

In order to receive a certificate, an application must be submitted to a CA of DFN-PKI.

The registration process involves the following steps, which must be completed and documented:

- Check that the certificate application is complete and correct
- Check the prospective DN in accordance with Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.5
- Check for an authentication of the Identity in accordance with Section 3.2.3 for certificates for natural persons
- Check the authentication of the Organisation in accordance with Section 3.2.2
- Examine the ownership of the private key in accordance with Section 3.2.1
- Verification of consent to the subscriber information („Informationen für Zertifikatinhaber“) and the privacy policy
- Confirm the authenticity of the certificate application by checking the clearance of the application by an empowered person, see Section 3.2.5

Accumulated paper documents must be archived and stored in a locked cabinet. Accumulated digital records must be archived and stored so as to prevent unauthorised access.

The information needed for the certification shall be passed on to the CA electronically in encrypted form and signed using the certificate of the responsible applicant representative.

### **4.2 Certificate Application Processing**

#### **4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions**

Identification and authentication of subjects is carried out in accordance with Section 3.2.

For authenticating organisation identity according to Section 3.2.2 it is possible to reuse existing documents and data if the documents or data are not older than 825 days.

For the verification of the right to use domains and IP addresses pursuant to Section 3.2.2, existing data and documents may be reused if the data or documents are not older than 825 days, and as of 01.10.2021, not older than 398 days.

If the certificate application is not intended for a data processing system and if the identification was performed by the DFN-PCA: For authenticating personal identity according to Section 3.2.3 it is possible to reuse existing documents or data if they are not older than 825 days.

For validation of authority according to Section 3.2.5 it is possible to reuse existing documents or data if they are not older than 39 months.

#### **4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications**

A certificate application will be accepted by the responsible CA if all steps in accordance with Section 4.1.2 have been successfully completed. Otherwise the application will be rejected and the Subscriber will be notified of this, giving reasons. When the authenticity of a certificate application for a data processing system is confirmed by an empowered person according to Section 4.1.2, it is checked for each domain name in a CN or a dnsName according to [RFC6844], whether CAA Resource Records according to [RFC6844] can be found in the DNS. If a CAA Resource Record is found, the certificate application can only be confirmed if the issue or issuewild property contain the value "pki.dfn.de" or "dfn.de". If the certificate could not be issued in 8 hours after the check, the certificate application is discarded. The check of CAA Resource Records is logged with its results.

If a certificate request is identified as a high-risk request, it is initially rejected and further validation is carried out to exclude the risk with certainty.

#### **4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications**

Certain minimum or maximum processing times are not guaranteed.

### **4.3 Certificate issuance**

#### **4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance**

The formal preconditions for the issuing of a certificate will be checked by the CA in an appropriate manner. In particular, the CA checks the entitlement of the participants to receive a certificate for the name given in the DN, and the validity of the signature of the applicant representative.

#### **4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

The Subscriber and if appropriate the subject will be sent the issued certificate by the CA by e-mail or they will be notified and informed about the possibility of downloading the certificate.

### **4.4 Certificate Acceptance**

The subject is obliged to verify the correctness of their own certificate and the certificate of the issuing CA on receipt.

#### **4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

A certificate has been accepted if it is used or if no objection is lodged within 14 days after receipt.

#### **4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

The Certificates are published by DFN-PCA through the repository service of DFN-PKI and, in case of certificates for Data processing systems, via third party operated log servers of the Certificate Transparency System. Subjects of user certificates are entitled to object to the publication of their certificate.

#### **4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

It is not necessary to notify other entities.

### **4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

#### **4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and certificate Usage**

Private keys shall be suitably protected. Certificates may only be used in accordance with this CP.

#### **4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

If Relying Parties use Certificates from the DFN-PKI, they must ensure that these have an appropriate Security Level in the context of the application. Furthermore, Relying Parties are obliged to ensure that a certificate is correct and valid. This includes checking the signature of the certificate by the issuing CA and checking if the certificate has been revoked.

## **4.6 Certificate Renewal**

In the case of certificate renewal without re-keying, a new certificate is issued with retention of the old key pair provided that the key pair meets the minimum cryptographic requirements of the CP, the information contained in the certificate is unchanged, and there is no suspicion that the private key has been compromised.

### **4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal**

An application may be made to renew a certificate if the validity of a certificate has expired.

### **4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal**

Certificate renewal is requested by the Subscriber.

### **4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests**

The certificate renewal procedure corresponds to the regulations for the first application under Section 4.3; for the identification and authentication the regulations apply in accordance with Section 3.3.1.

### **4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

The regulations apply in accordance with Section 4.3.2.

### **4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate**

The regulations apply in accordance with Section 4.4.1.

### **4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA**

The regulations apply in accordance with Section 4.4.2.

### **4.6.7 Notifying of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

The regulations apply in accordance with Section 4.4.3.

## **4.7 Certificate Re-Key**

In the case of certificate renewal with re-keying, a new certificate for a new key pair is issued provided the information contained in the existing certificate remains unchanged. The procedure follows Section 4.6 by analogy.

## **4.8 Certificate Modification**

A certificate can be modified if information contained in the certificate is to be changed (e.g. the purpose of use). The procedure follows Section 4.6 by analogy.

## **4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

Contact information for revocation applications is published online under the address [www.pki.dfn.de/policies/informationen](http://www.pki.dfn.de/policies/informationen).

Emergency cases when certificates from the DFN-PKI have been abused, used fraudulently or demonstrably compromised can be reported 24x7 under the e-mail address [cert-problems@dfn.de](mailto:cert-problems@dfn.de).

Certificates that have already expired cannot be revoked. The revocation of a certificate cannot be reversed.

### **4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation**

A certificate shall be revoked if any of the following apply:

- The certificate contains details that are not valid.
- The private key has been lost, stolen, disclosed, or otherwise compromised or abused.
- When the binding between the subject and the public key can no longer be ensured due to weaknesses in the cryptography used.
- The algorithm or a parameter is no longer sufficient for the intended use and the planned schedule provides for blocking.
- The subject is no longer entitled to use the certificate.
- The certificate infringes trade marks or similar in accordance with Section 3.1.6
- The use of the certificate contravenes the CP or the CPS.
- The issuing CA ceases operation.

- <https://www.cabforum.com/e> subject or Subscriber has applied for a certificate revocation.

Furthermore all reasons contained in chapter 4.9.1 of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates [CAB-BR].

#### **4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation**

A Subject or Subscriber may apply for a certificate revocation without giving reasons.

Third Parties may apply for a certificate revocation if they are able to provide hints that there are grounds for doing so under Section 4.9.1.

#### **4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Requests**

If a Subject or Subscriber applies for a revocation, they must provide authentication to the issuing CA. The possibilities are presented in Section 3.4. After authentication, the issuing CA carries out the revocation.

If a third party applies for a revocation, then the issuing CA shall investigate the reasons given. If any of the grounds listed in 4.9.1 pertain, then the revocation shall be carried out.

After revocation, the Subscriber and if appropriate the Subject shall be informed electronically. The revocation information shall be made available at least until the expiry date of the revoked certificate via the revocation services.

#### **4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period**

If there are reasons for a revocation (see Section 4.9.1) then a revocation must be applied for immediately.

#### **4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request**

A CA must carry out certificate revocation immediately if grounds exist (see Section 4.9.3).

After receipt of a revocation request relating to compromise of the key (possibly only suspected), misuse of the certificate or other circumstances of fraud, compromise, the CA investigates the facts and provides feedback to the certificate holder and, if applicable, the third party within 24 hours. It is investigated with the parties involved whether the certificate must be revoked within the deadlines defined in Chapter 4.9.1.1 of the [CAB-BR].

#### **4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties**

See Section 4.5.2.

#### **4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency**

CAs that do not exclusively issue CA certificates shall update and reissue a CRL every 24 hours. The date in the field nextUpdate of this CRLs must not be more than 10 days after the date in the field thisUpdate.

Other CAs shall update and reissue a CRL every 180 days. The date in the field nextUpdate of this CRLs must not be more than 12 months after the date in the field thisUpdate.

If a certificate is revoked then the revoking CA shall immediately update and reissue the CRL.

#### **4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs**

After CRLs are updated, they shall be reissued without delay, and at least within 1 hour.

#### **4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

CAs can offer OCSPs as online revocation and status checking procedures (see Section 4.10). This is obligatory for all CAs that issue certificates in accordance with [CAB-BR].

Revocation information shall be available continuously (24 hours a day, 7 days a week). It shall be ensured that unplanned outages and maintenance periods are minimised and that normal operations are restored as quickly as possible. Sufficient resources are provided to ensure a response time of 10 seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

#### **4.9.10 On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements**

The requirements for the protection of the private key apply in accordance with Section 6.2.

The correctness of the revocation and status information provided by the CA about certificates shall be ensured by the general security mechanisms of DFN-PCA (see Sections 5 and 6 and the CPS). During transmission, the revocation and status information is protected against manipulation by electronic signatures (see Sections 7.2 and 7.3).



Revoked certificates are entered into both the relevant CRL and the OCSP service.

Entries regarding revoked Certificates shall not be removed from the CRL or the OCSP service before expiry of the certificates in question.

The system time is synchronized continuously, at the latest every 24 hours, with the UTC reference time, e.g. via GPS or DCF77. By using suitable measures, the accuracy and monotonicity of the time is ensured within the scope of the state of the art.

#### **4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

There are no other forms of revocation advertisements available.

#### **4.9.12 Special Requirements re Key Compromise**

If a private key is compromised, the corresponding certificate is to be revoked immediately. If the private key of a CA is compromised, then all the certificates issued by the CA shall be revoked.

A compromise of a private key can be proven by:

- Using the private key to generate a PKCS#10 CSR that contains a clear indication of compromise (e.g., the string "The key that signed this CSR has been publicly disclosed."). This CSR is then transmitted to the DFN-PCA.
- Another artifact that is signed with the private key, which clearly indicates the compromise. This artifact is then transmitted to the DFN-PCA.
- The private key is transmitted directly to the DFN-PCA (not recommended).

#### **4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension**

Certificates cannot be suspended for a limited period.

#### **4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension**

No entry.

#### **4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request**

No entry.

#### **4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period**

No entry.

### **4.10 Certificate Status Services**

The obligation to provide CRLs is covered in Section 2.

Certificates for which an online certificate status protocol (OCSP) is offered contain a reference to this service. Certificates in accordance with the requirements of [CAB-BR] always include a reference to the OCSP service.

The OCSP-service gives a negative report for unissued certificates.

### **4.11 End of Subscription**

The use of a certificate ends either by revocation or if no application is received for a new certificate after the expiry of validity.

### **4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery**

#### **4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

The CAs in the DFN-PKI do not offer key escrow and recovery for subscribers or subjects. Subscribers using key escrow shall follow the stipulations in the document "*Pflichten der Teilnehmer*".

#### **4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices**

No entry.

## **5 Physical Controls**

Suitable security measures infrastructure, organisation and personnel security measures is essential for the secure operation of a PKI. These security measures are outlined in the CPS of the DFN-PKI. Detailed information about this and about the IT-security management

process is given in a security strategy. In addition, a risk analysis and evaluation is carried out regularly and documented. The results are not published, but are available for compliance audits (see Section 8). The details of the risk analysis are contained in the internal document *“Risikobewertung des PCA-Betriebs der DFN-PKI”*. In the following, measures are described for the infrastructural, organisational and personal security. Details are contained in the internal operating manual *“Betriebshandbuch der DFN-PKI”*. The operating manual is communicated to all employees of the DFN-PCA.

Unless specified otherwise, security measures are based on the measures in the IT Security Guidelines - Federal Office for Information Security [IT-GSHB].

The operating manual represents the Security Plan.

The requirements of the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements of the CA/Browser Forum are implemented [CAB-NETSEC].

The security plan, emergency/disaster planning and risk analysis are tested, reviewed and, if necessary, revised at least annually.

## 5.1 Site Location and Construction

The infrastructure security measures for all CAs are described in the CPS of DFN-PKI.

## 5.2 Procedural Controls

### 5.2.1 Trusted Roles

In Table 1, the security relevant roles are defined for the certification process. In order to ensure an orderly and audit-compliant operation of DFN-PKI, tasks must be allocated and roles separated accordingly. It is possible to share a role between several personnel. It is also possible that one person takes on more than one role, provided that the incompatibilities listed in Section 5.2.4 are taken into account.

Role	Duties	Abb.
Applicant representative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transmission of certificate applications to the relevant CA</li> <li>• Transmission of revocation applications to the relevant CA</li> <li>• Giving advice to the Subject</li> <li>• Carrying out personal Identification in accordance with Section 3.2.3 for user certificates and archiving the relevant documents</li> <li>• Applicant representatives may handle their own applications</li> </ul>	TS
Registration Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Receipt of certificate and revocation applications</li> <li>• Checking the authorisation of the Subscriber</li> <li>• Checking for completeness and correctness</li> <li>• Checking the authorisation of domain names</li> <li>• Release of certificates or revocation applications</li> <li>• Archiving documents</li> </ul>	RG
CA operator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use and storage of electronic media on which the private keys of the CA are stored.</li> <li>• Knowledge of the first half of the PIN (password) for the private key of the CA.</li> </ul>	CA01
PIN-Contributor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge of the second half of the PIN of the private key of CA.</li> </ul>	CA02
System and network administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Installation, configuration, administration and maintenance of IT and communications systems.</li> <li>• Control of the hardware and software, but no access to or knowledge about cryptographic keys and their PINs for the certification process</li> <li>• Exclusive knowledge of the boot and administrator passwords for the systems</li> </ul>	SA
System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supervision of data security and recovery for the necessary</li> </ul>	SO

Role	Duties	Abb.
operator	server and the CA application software.	
Reviser	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carrying out internal audits</li> <li>Supervising and observing data protection regulations</li> </ul>	R
Security officer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defining and investigating security provisions, in particular CPS and security strategies</li> <li>Allocation of roles and entitlements</li> <li>Contact partner for questions relating to security</li> </ul>	ISO

**Table 1: Roles**

### 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

In Table 2, tasks are described that require compliance with the four-eyes principle - with one representative for each of the given roles. All other activities can be carried out by one person. It shall be ensured that each role can be carried out by sufficient numbers of co-workers to ensure uninterrupted operations.

Task	Roles
Clearance and transmission of certificate and revocation applications for CA-Certificates	CA01 & CA02
Generation of key pairs for CA-Certificates	CA01 & CA02
Start of procedure for issuing certificates and CRLs	CA01 & CA02
Exchanging hardware and software components for the certification	SA & CA01

**Table 2: Tasks requiring the separation of duties (four-eyes principle)**

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

The identification and authentication for the roles shall take place on the basis of the role models described in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2. The technical access to the IT systems is by login name and password or a more secure procedure. Requirements regarding the use of passwords are to be given. Physical access to the IT systems must be regulated by access control measures. The access to bank deposit boxes shall require the personal identification and authentication of the key-holder.

### 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Table 3 shows the tasks that are not compatible with one another.

Role	Incompatible with (X)							
	TS	RG	CA01	CA02	SA	SO	R	ISO
TS - Applicant representative					X	X	X	X
RG - Registration Authority co-worker					X	X	X	X
CA01 - CA operator				X	X	X	X	X
CA02 - PIN Contributor			X				X	X
SA - System administrator	X	X	X				X	X
SO - System operator	X	X	X				X	X
R - Reviser	X	X	X	X	X	X		
ISO - Security officer	X	X	X	X	X	X		

**Table 3: Incompatibility of roles**

### **5.3 Personnel Controls**

Personnel security measures for all CAs are described in the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **5.4 Audit Logging Procedures**

Measures for security monitoring for all CAs are described in the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **5.5 Records Archival**

Archiving measures for all CAs are described in the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **5.6 Key Changeover**

The period of validity of keys is specified in Section 6.3.2. If the key of a CA has been compromised, then the provisions of Section 5.7 shall apply. After generation of a new CA key this must be published in accordance with Section 2.

### **5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery**

The business continuity plan includes:

1. The conditions for activating the plan,
2. Emergency procedures,
3. Fallback procedures,
4. Resumption procedures,
5. A maintenance schedule for the plan;
6. Awareness and education requirements;
7. The responsibilities of the individuals;
8. Recovery time objective (RTO);
9. Regular testing of contingency plans.
10. The CA's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
14. The distance of recovery facilities to the CA's main site; and
15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

#### **5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

The procedures for dealing with security incidents and the compromising of private keys of a CA shall be documented in writing and handed to all personnel. The principles of the procedures are provided in the following sub-Sections. The CA addresses any critical vulnerability not previously addressed, within a period of 48 hours after its discovery. When a breach of security or loss of integrity is likely to adversely affect a natural or legal person to whom the trusted service has been provided, the CA will notify the natural or legal person of the breach of security or loss of integrity without undue delay.

#### **5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted**

If faulty or manipulated computers, software and/or data are determined within a CA that could impact on the processes of the CA, then the operation of the relevant IT systems shall be stopped immediately.

The IT system must be restored on replacement hardware, with the software and the data from the security back-up, checked, and then put into service in a secure environment. Following this, the faulty or modified IT system shall be analysed. If intentional acts are

suspected then legal steps shall be taken as appropriate. In addition, security shall be reviewed in order to identify weak points. If necessary, additional defence measures shall be adopted to avoid similar incidents in the future. In such cases, the personnel of the DFN-PCA shall work together with the experts of the computer emergency team in DFN (DFN-CERT).

### **5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

If a private key has been compromised, then the associated certificate must be revoked (see Section 4.9.1).

If the private key of a CA has been compromised, then the certificate of the CA and all certificates issued with it shall be revoked. All affected Subscribers and Subjects shall be informed.

If algorithms or parameters are no longer sufficient for planned use, all subscribers, certificate validators and certificate holders are informed. A schedule is created for revoking the affected certificates.

### **5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster**

The resumption of the certification operations after a catastrophe must be part of the emergency planning, and resumption shall be possible within a short time as soon as the certification service is secure. The assessment of the security situation is the responsibility of the security officer.

After a disaster, measures are taken, as far as possible, to prevent a recurrence.

## **5.8 CA or RA Termination**

If a CA ceases operations, then the following measures shall be taken:

- Inform Subscribers or the Subjects and the Relying Parties
- Revoke all certificates issued by the CA, including all Certificates of applicant representatives
- Destroy the private keys of the CA
- Withdraw all authorisations to act on behalf of the CA

The DFN-PCA shall ensure that the archive and the complete revocation list continue to be accessible for the assured retention period (see CPS of DFN-PKI Section 5.4.3).

## **6 Technical Security Controls**

Suitable technical security measures are a precondition for the secure operation of a PKI. The main aspects of these security measures are described in the CPS of DFN-PKI. More detailed information is specified in a security strategy. In the following, the measures for technical security are outlined. Details are contained in the internal operating manual "*Betriebshandbuch der DFN-PKI*" (in German).

If not otherwise specified, security measures are based on the IT Security Guidelines - Federal Office for Information Security [IT-GSHB].

### **6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation**

#### **6.1.1 Key Pair Generation**

A procedure exists for generating key pairs of CAs. The documentation can be found in the DFN-PKI operating manual and accompanying documents.

The key pairs of all CAs shall be generated in a hardware security module (HSM) in accordance with the requirements of Section 6.2.1, applying the four-eyes principle (see Section 5.2.2). The number of personnel authorised for this task shall be limited to an operational minimum. Key pairs of CAs are generated under the supervision of a qualified auditor.

Subscribers shall generate their own key, following the regulations specified in the document "*Pflichten der Teilnehmer*".

#### **6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber**

No entry.

### **6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer**

The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) of the Subscriber shall be transmitted to the CA by e-mail, HTTPS or on a data medium. The correspondence of the CSR to a specific certificate application shall be confirmed by signature or electronic signature.

### **6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties**

The public key of all CAs of the DFN-PKI can be accessed through an information service in accordance with Section 2.

### **6.1.5 Key Sizes**

RSA keys with a modulus length of at least 2048 bits are permitted. The modulus length in bits must be divisible by 8. ECDSA keys must represent valid points on the following curves: NIST P-256, NIST P-384 or NIST P-521.

### **6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

RSA: The CA confirms that the value of the public exponent is an odd number equal to 3 or more. The public exponent should be in the range between  $2^{16} + 1$  and  $2^{256} - 1$ . The modulus should also have the following characteristics: an odd number, not the power of a prime, and have no factors smaller than 752.

ECDSA: The CA confirms the validity of all keys using either the ECC Full Public Key Validation Routine or the ECC Partial Public Key Validation Routine from Sections 5.6.2.3.2 and 5.6.2.3.3 of NIST SP 800-56A: Revision 2.

Keys that are known to be compromised (e.g. "Debian weak keys") or keys with weak parameters such as Value 1 RSA exponents shall not be used.

### **6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes**

The private keys of the CAs shall only be used for issuing certificates and for signing revocation information.

## **6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

The private key of every CA shall be stored in an HSM. When transported and stored, HSMs must be secure from manipulation. HSMs must be in proper working condition.

### **6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

HSMs that are used in accordance with Section 6.2 shall comply with one of the following or an equivalent standard:

- FIPS 140-2 Level 3
- CC EAL4

### **6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control**

Access to the private key of a CA shall follow the four-eyes principle in accordance with Section 6.2.8 by the roles CAO1 and CAO2 jointly.

### **6.2.3 Private Key Escrow**

DFN-PCA does not provide private key escrow.

### **6.2.4 Private Key Backup**

CA-keys are backed-up with FIPS-140 Level 3-conformant mechanisms of the HSM, with CA-keys in encrypted form. The encryption can only be carried out by the roles CAO1 and CAO2 in the HSM in accordance with the four-eyes principle. The four-eyes principle will be implemented by a PIN in two halves, with one half each known to the roles CAO1 and CAO2. Written copies of the two PIN halves are to be placed in sealed envelopes and deposited with a public notary.

The backup of the CA-key shall be stored in a bank deposit box.

### **6.2.5 Private Key Archival**

For archiving of private keys the regulations of Section 6.2.4 apply.

### **6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**

A private key of a CA are always generated in an HSM in accordance with Section 6.1.1.

### **6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

Private keys of a CA shall always be stored in an encrypted form on a cryptographic module.

### **6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key**

The PIN of private keys of a CA must be split into two halves. One half is known only to the role CAO1 and the other half only to the role CAO2. Activation is only possible in accordance with the four-eyes principle.

### **6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key**

The deactivation of the private key of a CA shall follow automatically when the certification process has ended.

### **6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key**

Before decommissioning an HSM, all the private keys stored on it must be destroyed. All copies of the private key of a CA must be destroyed after at the end of their life cycle.

When destroying the private key of a CA, the four-eyes principle shall be applied. The roles "ISO" and "CAO1" are responsible for the destruction.

### **6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating**

See Section 6.2.1.

## **6.3 Other aspects of Key Pair Management**

### **6.3.1 Public Key Archival**

See Section 5.5.

### **6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods**

The certificates issued in the DFN-PKI are valid for the following periods:

- Certificates for CAs (including for the DFN-PCA): a maximum of fifteen (15) years
- All other certificates for data processing systems: a maximum of 825 days, after 01 September 2020: 398 days.
- Certificates for natural persons and groups (user certificates): a maximum of 1185 days
- Certificates cannot be valid for longer than the issuing CA certificate.

For the period of use of key pairs, the rules from Section 6.1.6 apply. Before the key of a CA becomes invalid, a new key pair is generated in good time and made known to the relevant parties.

## **6.4 Activation Data**

### **6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation**

For passwords or PINs to activate private keys, non-trivial combinations of alphanumeric characters and special characters shall be selected. CA-keys shall contain at least 15 characters, and other keys 8 characters.

### **6.4.2 Activation Data Protection**

Activation data shall be kept secret and shall only be known by the personnel who need to know in accordance with Section 5.2.1 in order to carry out a specific function.

### **6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data**

No entry.

## **6.5 Computer Security Controls**

### **6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

All CAs shall be operated solely on the basis of hardened operating systems. In addition, access controls and user authentication shall be implemented as security measures.

CA systems enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

### **6.5.2 Computer Security Rating**

The security measures specified in Section 6.5.1 be according to the state of the art.

## **6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls**

For all CAs, the life-cycle of the security measures is described in the CPS of DFN-PKI.

## **6.7 Network Security Controls**

For all CAs, the security measures for the network are described in the CPS of DFN-PKI.

## **6.8 Time-Stamping**

No time stamping service is provided in the context of this CP.

# **7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profile**

## **7.1 Certificate Profile**

Each certificate must be assigned to a unique serial number by the issuing CA. Generated certificate serial numbers are non-sequential, greater than zero (0), and contain at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

### **7.1.1 Version Number**

Certificates are issued in accordance with the international standard X.509 in the Version 3. All Certificates include the following:

- Identification of the issuing CA and the country in which it is located
- The name of the Subject or a corresponding pseudonym
- The public key that corresponds to the private key under the control of the Subject
- The initial and final dates of the validity period of the certificate
- The series number of the certificate
- The electronic signature of the issuing CA
- If appropriate, limitations on the scope of use of the certificate

### **7.1.2 Certificate Extensions**

All certificate extensions in accordance with [X.509], [PKIX], [PKCS] and specific manufacturer extension are permitted.

#### **Certificates for CAs**

In certificates for CAs, the extension `keyUsage` shall be included with the values `keyCertSign` and `cRLSign` and the extension `basicConstraints` with the value `CA=True`. Certificates for CAs include an extension `cRLDistributionPoint` with a reference to the relevant revocation list and an extension `authorityInfoAccess` with a reference to the signing CA certificate and the relevant OCSP service.

#### **End-entity certificates**

Certificates for all other uses are optionally marked as non-CA certificate with the extension `basicConstraints` with the value `CA=False` and have no CA-specific `keyUsage` extension, i.e. the extension `keyUsage` may not contain the values `keyCertSign` or `cRLSign`.

The `keyUsage` extension may only have the value `nonRepudiation` if the private key cannot be restored and the private key can only be accessed by the Subject due to technical and organisational measures.

End-Entity-Certificates always contain the extension `cRLDistributionPoint` with a reference to the associated revocation list and the extension `authorityInfoAccess` with a reference to the signing CA-certificate. Certificates for data processing systems and certificates for natural persons and groups also always include the extension `authorityInfoAccess` with a reference to the relevant OCSP service.

Certificate are not issued with:



- a. Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet, unless: i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates ownership, or ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in a public context; or
- b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the certificate information verified by the CA.

### 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

The requirements from chapter 7.1.3 of [CAB-BR] and [CAB-SMIMEBR] apply.

### 7.1.4 Name Forms

See Section 3.1. Attributes not described in section 3.1 may be included if the included information has been validated by the CA.

Domain names and IP addresses that are contained in the Subject-DN are also always included in the alternative certificate name ("subjectAlternativeName") under the attributes "dNSName" or "iPAddress".

For every valid Certification Path (as defined by RFC 5280, Section 6):

- For each Certificate in the Certification Path, the encoded content of the Issuer Distinguished Name field of a Certificate is byte-for-byte identical with the encoded form of the Subject Distinguished Name field of the Issuing CA certificate.
- For each CA Certificate in the Certification Path, the encoded content of the Subject Distinguished Name field of a Certificate is byte-for-byte identical among all Certificates whose Subject Distinguished Names can be compared as equal according to RFC 5280, Section 7.1, and including expired and revoked Certificates.

### 7.1.5 Name Constraints

See Section 3.1.

### 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object identifier

The following OIDs are included in Certificates:

Certificates for data processing systems:

- 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.30: Compliancy with the Baseline Requirements of CA/Browser Forum [CAB-BR] (see Section 1.1).
- CA/Browser forum reserved OID OV 2.23.140.1.2.2
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4: Note of the "Global" security level and conformity with [ETSI319411].
- OID of this CP in accordance with Section 1.2
- OID of the CPS valid for the issuing CA
- If the certificate is intended for S/MIME use: An OID from chapter 7.1.6.1 of [CAB-SMIMEBR].

Certificates for other End-Entity Certificates (not for data processing systems):

- 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4: Display of the "Global" security level and conformity with [ETSI319411].
- OID of this CP in accordance with Section 1.2
- OID of the valid CPS for the issuing CA CPS

Certificates for CAs:

- 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.30: Compliancy with the Baseline Requirements des CA/Browser Forum [CAB-BR] (see Section 1.1).
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4: Note of the "Global" security level and conformity with [ETSI319411].
- Optional: 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4.2.2: OID von CP 2.2
- Optional: 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4.3.0: OID von CP 3.0
- Optional: 1.3.6.1.4.1.22177.300.1.1.4.3.1: OID von CP 3.1

### **7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extensions**

None.

### **7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics**

See Section 1.2.

### **7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension**

None.

## **7.2 CRL Profile**

For each CA in the DFN-PKI, a CRL is provided. This contains the revoked certificates of the CA. Each CRL contains the following information:

- Version number (see Section 7.2.1)
- Signature algorithm
- Identification of the issuing CA
- The date and time when issued in the field `thisUpdate`
- `nextUpdate` (see Section 4.9.7)
- Series numbers and revocation dates of the revoked certificates
- The electronic signature of the issuing CA

### **7.2.1 Version Number**

Revocation lists shall be drawn up in accordance with the international standard X.509, Version 2.

### **7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions**

The extensions `cRLNumber` and `authorityKeyIdentifier` (variant `keyid`) are set.

The `reasonCode` extension is used when the revocation reason is other than unspecified (0). When a `reasonCode` is set, it contains the most appropriate reason for revoking the certificate.

## **7.3 OCSP Profile**

The OCSP service is operated in accordance with [RFC6968].

OCSP-responses are signed with a certificate issued by the CA of the certificate to be tested. The certificate has the extension `id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck` set. Queries via HTTP-GET are supported. The OCSP responses have a validity interval greater than/equal to 8 hours and less than or equal to 10 days. OCSP responses about the status of a CA certificate are updated with the same frequency. After a certificate revocation, the OCSP response is updated immediately. The `revocationReason` field in the OCSP responses is set according to the rules for the CRL extension `reasonCode`. No OCSP extension with the OID 2.5.29.21 (`reasonCode` in CRLs) is set.

## **8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments**

The procedures for all CAs of DFN-PCA are to be designed so that they comply with this CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **8.1 Frequency and circumstances of assessment**

Frequency and circumstances of the assessment are regulated by ETSI EN 319 411-1 [ETSI319411]. The period during which the CA issues certificates is divided into an uninterrupted sequence of audit periods. An audit period may not last longer than one year.

### **8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor**

The assessment shall be carried out by an accredited auditor in accordance with ETSI EN 319 411-1 [ETSI319411].

The CA's audit SHALL be performed by a Qualified Auditor. A Qualified Auditor means a natural person, Legal Entity, or group of natural persons or Legal Entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

1. Independence from the subject of the audit;

2. The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme (see Section 8.4);
3. Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
4. (For audits conducted in accordance with any one of the ETSI standards) accredited in accordance with ISO 17065 applying the requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 403;
5. (For audits conducted in accordance with the WebTrust standard) licensed by WebTrust;
6. Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics; and
7. Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage

### **8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity**

The relationship of the assessor to the assessed entity follows from Section 8.3.

### **8.4 Topics covered by assessment**

The sectors covered by an audit or assessment and the method of conformity testing shall be in accordance with ETSI EN 319 411-1 [ETSI319411].

### **8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency**

The repair of identified deficiencies is the responsibility of the DFN-Verein.

### **8.6 Communications of Results**

The Audit Report SHALL state explicitly that it covers the relevant systems and processes used in the issuance of all Certificates that assert one or more of the policy identifiers listed in Section 7.1.6.1. The CA SHALL make the Audit Report publicly available. The CA MUST make its Audit Report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. In the event of a delay greater than three months, the CA SHALL provide an explanatory letter signed by the Qualified Auditor.

The Audit Report MUST contain at least the following clearly-labelled information:

1. name of the organization being audited;
2. name and address of the organization performing the audit;
3. the SHA-256 fingerprint of all Roots and Subordinate CA Certificates, including Cross Certificates, that were in-scope of the audit;
4. audit criteria, with version number(s), that were used to audit each of the certificates (and associated keys);
5. a list of the CA policy documents, with version numbers, referenced during the audit;
6. whether the audit assessed a period of time or a point in time;
7. the start date and end date of the Audit Period, for those that cover a period of time;
8. the point in time date, for those that are for a point in time;
9. the date the report was issued, which will necessarily be after the end date or point in time date; and
10. (for audits conducted in accordance with any of the ETSI standards) a statement to indicate if the audit was a full audit or a surveillance audit, and which portions of the criteria were applied and evaluated, e.g. DVCP, OVCP, NCP, NCP+, LCP, EVCP, EVCP+, QCP-w, Part 1 (General Requirements), and/or Part 2 (Requirements for Trust Service Providers).
11. (for audits conducted in accordance with any of the ETSI standards) a statement to indicate that the auditor referenced the applicable CA/Browser Forum criteria, such as this document, and the version used.

An authoritative English language version of the publicly available audit information MUST be provided by the Qualified Auditor and the CA SHALL ensure it is publicly available.

The Audit Report MUST be available as a PDF, and SHALL be text searchable for all information required. Each SHA-256 fingerprint within the Audit Report MUST be uppercase letters and MUST NOT contain colons, spaces, or line feeds.

## **8.7 Self-Audits**

Regular self-audits are conducted in accordance with Section 8.7 of the [CAB-BR] and [CAB-SMIMEBR].

## **9 Other Business and Legal Matters**

### **9.1 Fees**

The DFN-Verein charges for its services at the usual rates of DFN-PKI.

### **9.2 Financial Responsibility**

Insurance cover and guarantees for material defects and deficits of title are not provided for.

### **9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information**

An inventory of all assets is maintained. The assets are assigned a classification consistent with the risk assessment.

#### **9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information**

All information about subscribers to DFN-PKI or subjects that is not covered by Section 9.3.2, shall be deemed to be confidential information. Subjects are entitled to inspect the data that was archived relating to the issuance of their certificate. Within the scope of the German Data Protection Act, the same shall apply for the subscriber.

#### **9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information**

Information is classified as non-confidential if it is contained in the published certificates and revocation lists either explicitly (e.g. e-mail addresses) or implicitly (e.g. data about the certification) or if it can be derived from these.

#### **9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information**

The DFN-PCA is responsible for measures to protect confidential information. Data may only be passed on in the course of providing services if a confidentiality declaration has previously been signed and the personnel entrusted with the tasks have given an undertaking to comply with the legal requirements for data protection.

### **9.4 Privacy of Personal Information**

#### **9.4.1 Privacy Plan**

The DFN-PCA must electronically store and process the private data required for the provision of its services. This is done in compliance with the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG).

#### **9.4.2 Information Treated as Private**

For private data, the provisions of Section 9.3.1 shall apply by analogy.

#### **9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private**

For private data the provisions of Section 9.3.2 shall apply by analogy.

#### **9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information**

For private data, the provisions of Section 9.3.3 shall apply by analogy.

#### **9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information**

The DFN-PCA utilises private data to the extent that is necessary to perform the services.

#### **9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial and Administrative Process**

The DFN-Verein is subject to the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and must release confidential and private information if obliged to do so under law or if a court orders the release.

#### **9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No further circumstances are envisaged for a disclosure of information.

## **9.5 Intellectual Property rights**

The DFN-Verein is originator of this CP, and the CPS of the DFN-PKI. They are made available under the terms of the Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0) licence, <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/>.

## **9.6 Representations and Warranties**

### **9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties**

The DFN-PKI is a service of the *Verein zur Förderung eines Deutschen Forschungsnetzes e.V.* (DFN-Verein). The DFN-PCA is operated by the DFN-CERT Services GmbH (DFN-CERT) under a service contract for data processing. The DFN-Verein carries out the resultant audit duties with regard to DFN-CERT and thus ensures that the agreed procedures can be implemented.

If further contractors carry out duties in the DFN-PKI, then it will be verified by means of suitable measures and assessments that the tasks carried out comply with the requirements in accordance with the CP and CPS of DFN-PKI. The responsibility for the operation of the CAs of DFN-PKI remains with the DFN-Verein.

The DFN-Verein has adopted adequate measures within the framework of legal requirements for the eventuality that, as a result of insolvency or for other reasons, it is itself no longer in a position to ensure the minimum continuation of services after termination of the CA operations in accordance with [ETSI319411].

The DFN-Verein has taken adequate precautions in order to be able to meet the liabilities arising from its activities with relation to the DFN-PKI.

The DFN-Verein has the financial stability and the resources to operate a CA in conformity with the requirements of [ETSI319411].

The departments of the DFN-PCA that issue and revoke certificates have a documented structure that ensures impartial execution of their duties.

The DFN-PCA undertakes to carry out conscientiously all the duties described in this CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties**

The DFN-PCA is obliged to carry out all the duties specified in this CP and in the CPS of DFN-conscientiously.

### **9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties**

Each subscriber shall sign a subscriber agreement with the DFN-Verein. In this the subscriber undertakes in particular to comply with this CP.

In addition, the provisions contained in the document "*Pflichten der Teilnehmer*" shall be complied with. The Subscriber shall also inform Subjects about the provisions in the document "*Information für Zertifikatinhaber*" and obtain their undertaking to comply with these. When the certificate is sent to the Subject by e-mail, the DFN-PCA will attach this document.

### **9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

The provisions of section 4.5.2 apply.

### **9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

To the extent that other participants are involved in the certification process as service-providers, then the DFN-PCA is responsible for obliging the service-provider to comply with the CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

## **9.7 Disclaimer of Warranties**

Warranty is regulated in the contracts between the participating parties.

## **9.8 Limitations of Liability**

Limitations of liability are regulated in the contracts between the participating parties.

## **9.9 Indemnities**

Indemnification is regulated in the contracts between the participating parties.

## **9.10 Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1 Term**

The CP and the CPS of DFN-PKI come into force on the date contained in them. They will be made public through the corresponding information service (see Section 2). A change to the CP or CPS of the DFN-PKI will be announced in advance by the DFN-Verein, giving a period of notice appropriate for the scope of the amendments, but at least two weeks in advance.

The management board of the DFN-Verein is responsible for the implementation of and compliance with this CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI.

### **9.10.2 Termination**

This document is valid until it is replaced by a new version (see section 9.10.1) or until the DFN-PCA ceases operations.

### **9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival**

Termination of the CP or the CPS does not affect the responsibility to protect confidential information and private data.

## **9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

The DFN-PCA retains the right to make other communications apart from those specified in this CP, at its discretion.

## **9.12 Amendments**

An amendment to the CP may only be made by the management of the DFN-Verein. If amendments affect security-relevant aspects or require the Subscriber to make changes to procedures, then the OID of the CP shall be amended (see Section 1.2).

## **9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions**

The contact named in Section 1.5.2 is responsible for the resolution of disputes. If a dispute cannot be resolved at this level, then the management of the DFN-Verein can be called on, and if necessary the Committee of the DFN-Verein.

## **9.14 Governing Law**

The operations of the DFN-PKI are governed by the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.

## **9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law**

In the DFN-PKI, the DFN-Verein issues certificates with which advanced electronic signatures can be generated in accordance with the German Digital Signature Act. These may be called on as evidence before a court of law.

## **9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions**

### **9.16.1 Entire Agreement**

All the provisions contained in this CP and the CPS of the DFN-PKI apply between the DFN-Verein and the participants. When a new version is issued it replaces all previous versions. Verbal agreements and side agreements are not valid.

### **9.16.2 Assignments**

Rights and obligations arising from this CP can be assigned in accordance with usual legal requirements.

### **9.16.3 Severability**

Should individual provisions of this CP or the CPS of the DFN-PKI prove to be ineffective or incomplete this shall not affect the validity of the other provisions.

Instead of the ineffective provision, an effective provision shall be deemed to be agreed which comes as close as possible to the intention of the ineffective provision. In the event of gaps, then a provision shall be deemed to be agreed that would have reasonably been agreed in accordance with the intention of this CP or the CPS if the matter had been taken into consideration from the start.

#### 9.16.4 Legal disputes / Place of jurisdiction

Legal disputes arising from the actions of a CA operating within the DFN-PKI are subject to the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. Place of performance and exclusive place of jurisdiction is the location of the DFN-Verein. The DFN-Verein is registered at the Local Court Berlin-Charlottenburg under the number 7729NZ.

#### 9.17 Other Provisions

The services provided will be made accessible for people with disabilities as far as possible. This CP, the CPS, the security policy and the inventory of assets are reviewed annually or when significant changes occur, and are adjusted if necessary. Changes that have an impact on the security level are approved by management.

## 10 References

- [CAB-BR] Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, CA/Browser Forum, <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements/>
- [CAB-NETSEC] Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, CA/Browser Forum, <https://cabforum.org/network-security-requirements/>
- [CAB-SMIMEBR] Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates, CA/Browser Forum, <https://cabforum.org/smime-br/>
- [DFN2000] Satzung des DFN-Vereins, July 2000, <http://www.dfn.de/fileadmin/6Organisation/Geschaeftsstelle/satzungdfn.pdf>
- [EIDAS] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0910>
- [ETSI319411] Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements, EN 319 411-1
- [IANA\_IP4] IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry, IANA, <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml>
- [IANA\_IP6] IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry, IANA, <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml>
- [ISO-3166-1] Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, [http://www.iso.org/iso/country\\_codes/iso\\_3166\\_code\\_lists/country\\_names\\_and\\_code\\_elements.htm](http://www.iso.org/iso/country_codes/iso_3166_code_lists/country_names_and_code_elements.htm)
- [IT-GSHB] IT Security Guidelines - Federal Office for Information Security <https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ITGrundschutz/ITSecurityGuidelines/guidelines.html>
- [PKCS] Public Key Cryptography Standards, RSA Security Inc., RSA Laboratories, <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs>
- [PKIX] RFCs und Spezifikationen der IETF Arbeitsgruppe Public Key Infrastructure (X.509)
- [RFC2606] Reserved Top Level DNS Names, Network Working Group, IETF, 1999
- [RFC3647] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, Network Working Group, IETF, 2003
- [RFC6844] DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record, P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling IETF, 2013

- [RFC6960] X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol – OCSP, S. Santesson et. al., IETF, 2013
- [RFC822] Standard for ARPA Internet Text Messages, David H. Crocker, 1982
- [X.509] Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: authentication framework, Version 3, ITU, 1997

## 11 Glossary and abbreviations

Term	Explanation
Applicant	The applicant is always a subscriber
Authorization Domain Name	The Domain Name used to obtain authorization for certificate issuance for a given FQDN. The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If the FQDN contains a wildcard character, then the CA MUST remove all wildcard labels from the left most portion of requested FQDN. The CA may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation.
Base Domain Name	The portion of an applied-for FQDN that is the first domain name node left of a registry- controlled or public suffix plus the registry-controlled or public suffix (e.g. "example.co.uk" or "example.com"). For FQDNs where the right-most domain name node is a gTLD having ICANN Specification 13 in its registry agreement, the gTLD itself may be used as the Base Domain Name.
CA	Certification Authority
CA certificate	Certificate from with further certificates (CA and/or End-Entity certificates) can be issued
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CSR	Certificate signing request
DFN-PCA	Main certification authority of the DFN-PKI (Policy Certification Authority)
Subscriber agreement	Contractual basis for subscribing to the DFN-PKI
DN	Unique name of the Subject or issuer in certificates. (Distinguished name)
End - entity certificate	All non-CA certificates
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)	Practical (technical and organisational) implementation of the certification policy
Domain Contact	The Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contract (or the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar.



Term	Explanation
EXT	Attribute in CN: external subject
GRP	Attribute in CN: Person or functional group
Subject information	Information for the Subject on handling private keys t
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
Public key	Key of a cryptographic key pair which is made public. It can be used to check electronic signatures
OID	Object identifier - unique reference to an object in a name space
PCA	Policy Certification Authority
PKCS#7	Data exchange format for the transmission of signatures and encrypted data or for the distribution of certificates [PKCS]
PKCS#10	Data exchange format for transmission of the public key and DN of a certificate request (CSR) to a CA [PKCS]
PKCS#12	Data exchange format for the storage of private and public keys which are secured with a password on the basis of a symmetrical encryption process [PKCS]
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PN	Attribute in CN: Pseudonym
Private key	Key of a cryptographic key pair, which is only available to the owner. A private key can be used to generate an electronic signature
RA	Registration Authority
Registration Authority	Registration authorities register subscribers of a CA and receive certificate requests for CAs
Revocation request	If a certificate is to be declared invalid before expiry, a revocation request must be submitted for this certificate
Revocation list	List of all revoked certificates of a CA
Subscriber	Subscribers are organisations that take part in the DFN-PKI and have signed a corresponding agreement with the DFN-Verein
Subscriber-service	A subscriber service carries out duties relating to the issuing of certificates that can more appropriately be done locally at the Subscriber.
Applicant Representative	The Applicant representative applies for certificates for the Subscriber, advises subjects, and can carry out personal identification on behalf of the Registration Authority
Certificate	Allocation of a cryptographic key to a name, confirmed by the signature of a CA
Certificate request	Document in paper or electronic form with which a CA applies for a certificate. It contains the name of the applicant, the DN for the certificate and the public key.
Subject	The entity described in the subject field of the certificate, i.e. a natural person, a group of individuals, or a data processing system

Term	Explanation
Certificate name	Synonyms: Subject-DN, Name
Relying party	Natural person or legal entity relying on the certificate
Public key infrastructure (PKI)	The technical equipment and associated processes and concepts necessary for asymmetrical cryptography
Certificate Policy (CP)	The Certificate Policy of a PKI specifies the provisions that all participants must comply with. Each PKI contains only one certificate policy.
Certification Authority (CA)	The main task of the certification authority is the issuing of certificates

## 12 Change history

For changes further in the past refer to <https://www.pki.dfn.de/policies/policyarchiv>

Version	Change	Date
6	Title and footer: Version number and date 1.2: OIDs 4.9.7 und 7.2: Adjustments concerning rules for issuance of revocation lists	03.04.2020
7	Title and footer: Version number and date 1.2: OIDs 1.5.2: E-mail-address for problem reports 3.2.2: Validation of IP-addresses according to method 3.2.2.5.3 of BR added. Removed abolished method. 3.2.3: Adjustment to changes in PostIdent service 4.9: E-mail-address: clarification of procedure 6.3.2: Adjustment of max. validity times of certificates for data processing systems according to Apple's requirements after 01 September 2020 6.4.2: Change of protection of activation data	03.06.2020
8	Title and footer: Version number and date 1.2: OIDs 1.5.2 und 4.9: Removal of phone number 4.9.8: Fixed time period 4.9.10: Synchronicity between OCSP and CRL 5.2.1 Handling of own applications of applicant representatives Corrected order of chapters 8.1-8.4 9.17: Accessibility, review of CP, security plan, assets, management approval	30.09.2020
9	Title and footer: Version number and date 1.2: OIDs 3.1.1: SN, GN, pseudonym; CN single-value 3.1.2: SN, GN, pseudonym; CN single-value	30.06.2021

	<p>3.1.3: Attribute pseudonym</p> <p>4.2.1: Change period for reuse of data for domains and IP addresses to 398 days as of 1.10.2021</p> <p>4.9.12: Methods to prove key compromise</p>	
10	<p>Title and footer: Version number and date</p> <p>1.2: OIDs</p> <p>3.2.2: Footnote corrected</p> <p>10: Reference IANA special-purpose addresses adjusted to Ballot SC48</p>	01.10.2021
11	<p>Title and footer: Version number and date.</p> <p>1.2: OIDs</p> <p>4.1.2: Consent check</p> <p>4.9.1: Blocking reasons added</p> <p>4.9.10: Time synchronization</p> <p>5: Communicate operating manual DFN-PCA internally</p> <p>5.7.3: Measures in case of algorithm problems</p> <p>5.7.4: Measures to prevent recurrence</p> <p>6.1.1: Procedure for generating key pairs of CAs</p> <p>6.2: Functionality of HSMs</p> <p>6.3.2: Validity of certificates adapted to Apple policy</p> <p>9.3: Inventory of assets</p>	14.11.2022
12	<p>Cover: reference to CC BY-ND</p> <p>1.1 reference to S/MIME-BR, stop of issuance of new certificates from 01.09.2023 on</p> <p>1.2 OIDs</p> <p>2.2 test websites</p> <p>2.3 reference to S/MIME-BR</p> <p>3.1.1, 3.1.2: adapted naming scheme to S/MIME-BR, naming scheme for CA certificates</p> <p>3.1.4 no metadata, OU removed</p> <p>3.2 certificate type described, sources for organization validation</p> <p>3.2.2 adapted organization validation to S/MIME-BR</p> <p>3.2.3 adapted validation of personal data to S/MIME BR</p> <p>3.2.5 subscriber can request list of authorized personnel</p> <p>3.2.6 publication of cross certificates</p> <p>4.2.1 documentation reuse according to S/MIME-BR</p> <p>4.2.2 procedures for high risk requests; logging of CAA</p> <p>4.9.5 time limits</p> <p>4.9.9 resources for response times <math>\leq 10</math> seconds</p> <p>5 reference to NetSec Requirements, yearly review of plans and concepts</p> <p>5.7.1 elements of business continuity plan</p> <p>6.1.1 auditor as witness for key creation</p> <p>6.1.5, 6.1.6 more details in description for key parameters</p> <p>6.2.1 update of standard version</p> <p>6.5.1 multi-factor auth</p> <p>7.1 enhanced description of serial number generation</p> <p>7.1.2 no misleading extensions</p>	01.09.2023

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>7.1.3 added reference to CAB-BR/CAB-SMIMEBR</li><li>7.1.4 name encoding; additional attributes</li><li>7.1.6 OIDs from S/MIME-BR</li><li>7.2.2 CRL reasonCode</li><li>7.3 OCSP profile with more details</li><li>8.1 audit requirements</li><li>8.2 auditor requirements</li><li>8.6 requirements audit reports</li><li>8.7 self audits</li><li>9.5 reference to CC BY-ND</li><li>10 S/MIME BR and NetSec Requirements from CA/Browser forum</li></ul>	
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